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This discussion paper presents two 
related discussions on different aspects 
of contemporary Melanesian economic 
engagement. We consider the case of 
U-Vistract, a mass pyramid scheme which 
not only promises limitless wealth to its 
investors but even envisages a new global 
economic system, blessed by God and 
centred in Bougainville under the leadership 
of a self-proclaimed king.  This is followed 
by a discussion on a contrasting movement 
called “Personal Viability” which is based 
upon self-help philosophies that aim to 
cultivate an entrepreneurial persona. 
In the first section John Cox addresses 
the recent wave of “fast money schemes”, 
discussing institutional and ideological 
links between these scams and Christian 
churches, particularly Pentecostal prosperity 
gospel teachings. He also explores the 
tensions between Pentecostal views of 
morality, millennialism and the state which 
may have contributed to the spread of fast 
money schemes in PNG. In the second 
section Nick Bainton concentrates upon the 
uptake of the Personal Viability movement 
in the Lihir Islands which have been host to 
a major gold mining project since 1995. Elite 
Lihirian leaders were inspired by Personal 
Viability philosophies as they renegotiated 
the community compensation and benefits 
package with the mining company throughout 
2000-2007 and as they tried to develop 
strategies to achieve greater self-reliance 
and financial independence to address the 
so-called resource dependency syndrome. 
While apparently obscure and even 
deceptive or ridiculous, these movements 
have offered alternative accounts of states 
and the global economy, and the place of 
Melanesian states and communities within 
them, which are sufficiently convincing to 
draw thousands of followers. In Bougainville, 
they can involve direct challenges to the 
legitimacy and authority of the state, and in 
Lihir they have been crucial to the generation 
of local plans for economic and political 
autonomy. By studying these movements, 
we hope to uncover insights into wider 
concerns of state and nation building (and 
legitimacy), and also into understandings 
of economic development and of prosperity 
within Melanesia. 
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FINANCING thE END-tIME 
hARvESt: PyRAMID SChEMES 
AND PROSPERIty GOSPElS 
IN PAPUA NEw GUINEA
John Cox
Leading up to the millennial year 2000, 
Papua New Guinea experienced a rush 
of “fast money” schemes: pyramid scams 
promising returns on deposits of 100% within 
a few weeks or months.1 While returns of 
this magnitude might seem self-evidently 
“too good to be true”, the public response 
was remarkable. The schemes spread “like a 
bushfire”. Thousands raced to make deposits 
hoping to make it rich. Some “investors” put 
their National Provident Fund or other long 
term savings into the schemes while others 
sold real estate for fear of missing out on the 
“fast money” payments. Churches, women’s 
groups and schools all put money into the 
schemes, wanting to cash in on the high 
returns. The Bank of Papua New Guinea 
(BPNG), alarmed at the scale of withdrawals 
from private bank accounts, warned that 
fast money schemes “had the potential to 
destroy the financial system” (National, 22 
Oct 1999). Long queues formed outside the 
larger schemes’ makeshift offices. Initially 
lines of people making deposits, they later 
became lines of angry unpaid investors 
wanting their money back. When the bubble 
finally burst, millions of kina had been lost. 
Yet the story of the fast money schemes did 
not end with a salutary lesson concerning 
risk and greed. Almost ten years on, many 
investors continue to wait for their payments 
and believe that “the money is there” but that 
it is being withheld by corrupt government 
authorities. 
This section takes up the story of U-Vistract, 
the largest and most controversial “fast money” 
scheme, exploring links between U-Vistract 
and Christianity, particularly in the prosperity 
theology promoted by Pentecostals. The 
intention is to explain how this scam spread 
using religious networks and ideas against 
the weak capacity, reach and legitimacy of 
state institutions. 
U-vIStRACt
“U-Vistract Financial Systems” was founded 
by Noah Musingku, from Tonu in South 
Bougainville. It emerged in 1998 at the close 
of the Bougainville crisis and initially promoted 
itself as the “Bank for Bougainvilleans”, 
drawing on Bougainvilleans’ sense of having 
been exploited by international capital. At the 
peak of U-Vistract’s influence, the President of 
the Bougainville People’s Congress, Joseph 
Kabui, described U-Vistract as a “window 
of hope” for Bougainville and asked for tax 
relief for U-Vistract and related schemes 
(Post-Courier, 26 August 1999).2 Kabui 
subsequently become a fierce opponent of 
U-Vistract and more recently described the 
scheme as “lies and bullshit” (National, 23 
May 2004). 
U-Vistract’s early membership largely 
consisted of Bougainvilleans living, working 
or studying in Port Moresby. Several high 
level Bougainvilleans received large payouts 
from the scheme, the best known being the 
then Chief Ombudsman, a Bougainvillean 
highly regarded for his integrity and support 
of governance reform (Australian, 13 May 
2000). Others, even students, made a lot 
of money and became notorious for their 
extravagant lifestyles. Often money was sent 
from relatives in Bougainville to be invested. 
Alongside U-Vistract ran other Bougainvillean 
schemes such as “Nekong” and “Millennium”. 
“Money Rain” was another very large fast 
money scheme that was effectively an agency 
of U-Vistract for non-Bougainvilleans.3 There 
were at least ten of these schemes running 
in parallel, all relegitimating each other’s 
extravagant promises. As the pyramid 
expanded, Bougainvilleans invested on behalf 
of others. Soon the scheme was opened up to 
anyone willing to deposit money, regardless 
of their origins. Within a few years, some 
70,000 Papua New Guineans had deposited 
K350 million into U-Vistract alone. U-Vistract 
also attracted followers in Australia, Solomon 
Islands and Fiji. In Australia, a small number 
of Queensland investors contributed some 
AUD500,000 between July and October 
1999. Some were Bougainvilleans working 
or studying abroad. This drew the attention 
of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC), which stopped the 
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further spread of the scheme and required 
U-Vistract to return the money to its investors 
(ASIC, 1999). 
Initially, U-Vistract had support from the 
PNG Government, led by Prime Minister 
Bill Skate. Skate’s Treasurer, Iairo Lasaro, 
exempted U-Vistract and nine other fast 
money schemes from the requirements of 
the Financial Institutions Act. Skate and his 
Deputy are said to have been large investors 
in U-Vistract and Money Rain. Many Papua 
New Guineans believe it was their extravagant 
investments (of public money) that exhausted 
the schemes’ capacity to pay. In late 1999, 
the incoming Morauta government revoked 
the exemptions and gave the schemes three 
months to pay their investors or be closed 
down. Morauta prepared a new Financial 
Institutions Act, partly in response to the 
unchecked spread of the schemes. The 
new BPNG Governor attacked the schemes, 
initiating legal proceedings and issuing public 
warnings (Government of Papua New Guinea, 
2000: para 32). These measures resulted in 
the collapse of the major schemes, who all 
blamed the government for their downfall. 
Musingku defied court orders and continued 
to operate. He was declared bankrupt (Post- 
Courier, 15 June 2000) and subsequently 
charged with contempt of court for continuing 
to solicit deposits. Musingku attempted to 
set up another money scheme, the “Royal 
Reserve Bank of Papala”, but police and 
BPNG officials raided the new pseudo-bank 
and closed it down. In 2002, Musingku fled to 
Bougainville and thence to Solomon Islands. 
In Honiara, as the “Royal Assembly of Nations 
and Kingdoms” (a fictional alternative United 
Nations), Musingku offered assistance to 
the Solomon Islands Government (SIG). 
The deal would have paid Musingku USD10 
million for settling SIG debts of SBD1.7 billion 
(USD350 million). Musingku would pay in 
“U-V Dollars” (Fraenkel, 2004: 154). This 
absurd transaction was nearly approved. 
However, a more substantial arrangement 
between SIG and the Australian Government 
meant Musingku’s time in Honiara was 
limited. He again fled, before the arrival of 
the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI). Back in PNG, Musingku 
unsuccessfully approached Somare, the 
new Prime Minister (Post- Courier, 25 Sep 
2003). 
Returning to Bougainville, Musingku courted 
separatist leader Francis Ona by trying to 
link the Royal Kingdom of Papala with Ona’s 
Meekamui. This proceeded as far as a 
coronation of Ona, overseen by Musingku 
(National, 23 May 2004). However, as his 
promises failed to materialise, Musingku fell 
out with Ona and retreated to his own village, 
Tonu, where he also crowned himself “King 
David Pei II” of the Kingdom of Papala. In 
2006, Musingku recruited Fijian mercenaries, 
provoking the headline “U-Vistract Plots War” 
(Post-Courier, 9 Mar 2006), not to mention a 
diplomatic incident involving the Governments 
of Fiji, PNG and Solomon Islands (whence 
the mercenaries had entered Bougainville).4 
From Bougainville, Musingku continues to 
attract headlines, most recently for printing 
the “Bougainville Kina”, with the face of 
Jesus Christ on the fifty kina note (Sydney 
Morning Herald, 8 July 2009).5 
“INSIDE tRACkS” AND “UNRUly 
COAlItIONS”: PAyOUtS AND 
PAtRONAGE
“…If public gossip is to be believed, 
the iniquitous U-Vistract net not only 
enmeshed ordinary families, but dozens 
of institutional investors, the boards of 
management of schools, the elders of 
churches, and perhaps most significantly, 
a considerable number of members of 
Parliament. It seems possible that it is 
these elected or appointed leaders who 
are the most unwilling to reveal their 
exposure to U-Vistract. For how will they 
explain their action in “investing” public 
money in U-Vistract, fully aware that 
the same funding was ear-marked for 
projects and electoral advancement? They 
cannot. So these experienced and well-
educated people are consumed with shame 
and embarrassment as a result of their 
actions. Above all, they do not want their 
involvement with U-Vistract to come to 
light, and they will give only the most 
lukewarm response to responsible attempts 
to bring Mr Musingku to account…” 
(Editorial, National, 11 February 2005)
Not everyone loses in a pyramid scheme: 
some early investors may actually receive 
the promised payments. They then validate 
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the schemes for subsequent investors by 
demonstrating that the money really is there 
and that the scheme works. This “evidence” 
then fuels a mass rush into pyramid 
schemes. However, it would be naïve to 
think that U-Vistract functioned on a rational 
and orderly “first come, first served” basis. 
Early payments to prominent and respected 
people generate interest and confidence 
in a scheme. Targeting politicians and 
bureaucrats may also help the scheme to 
avoid being investigated or may compromise 
the reputations of others in positions of 
responsibility, as suggested in the comments 
above by the editor of the National. 
Anthropologist Katherine Verdery, studying 
pyramid scams in Romania, argues that 
Romanian scams were established to 
mobilise savings and redistribute these 
resources to an “inside track”. Those already 
involved with the scam would always be 
rewarded, regardless of their notional position 
in the “queue”. Verdery sees these people 
as members of “unruly coalitions”: informal 
groups with common political or economic 
interests, including criminal activities (Verdery, 
1995: 656-664). There are indications of 
something similar working in PNG. Although 
the nature of the case makes evidence 
extremely difficult to produce, some of the 
political links with pyramid schemes are on 
the public record. As noted above, U-Vistract 
and other money schemes flourished under 
patronage from the Skate Government and 
were given exemptions from a range of 
legislative requirements. 
Prime Minister Bill Skate and Treasurer Iairo 
Lasaro, publicly identified as “Born Again” 
Christians. Skate’s Government sponsored a 
visit of the televangelist, Benny Hinn (Gibbs, 
2005; also Jorgensen, 2005). Lasaro was an 
elder with the Christian Life Centre (CLC), a 
Pentecostal church Musingku also attended. 
CLC members were allowed to invest in 
U-Vistract, even non-Bougainvilleans. 
Senior public servants are believed to have 
“borrowed” government money to invest in 
the schemes, returning the principal and 
profiting from the exercise. The Clerk of 
Parliament, said to have been the key contact 
person for the Money Rain scheme (another 
large scheme feeding into U-Vistract) among 
politicians and parliamentary employees, 
invested K300,000 of parliamentary funds 
into Money Rain. He escaped prosecution 
as his investment was successful and he 
was able to repay the parliamentary fund. 
The Clerk had also taken money from United 
Church groups in his own area to invest in 
the scheme (National, 29 June 2007). 
FASt MONEy AND RElIGIOUS 
ORGANISAtIONS
Fast money schemes made many connections 
with religious groups. At the community level, 
many church leaders, congregations and 
other church bodies invested in the schemes 
and some even acted as promoters. A United 
Church women’s group attracted considerable 
attention when they were left stranded in 
Port Moresby on their way to a regional 
church meeting in Samoa. Apparently a 
Bishop had lost the women’s funds in the 
Money Rain scheme (Post-Courier, 23 Aug 
1999). In another incident, a United Church 
Bishop invested K50,000 of church funds in 
U-Vistract, losing the whole amount. Salaries 
for church executives were not paid for a 
year but no disciplinary action was taken.
The United Church was not the only historic 
mainline church to become involved in 
the schemes. However, other churches 
responded more decisively at an institutional 
level. A Lutheran congregation in Lae was 
drawn into the scheme by a former pastor 
but, because of these activities, he was 
subsequently expelled from the church. 
Catholic and Anglican clergy were quick to 
warn against the schemes, although this did 
not stop individuals from investing. Perhaps 
the congregational governance and funding 
structures of the United Church and various 
Pentecostal Churches made them more 
vulnerable to fraud than more hierarchical 
churches. 
 
Pentecostal networks supported U-Vistract 
(Gibbs, 2005). Three Pentecostal pastors 
gave written character witnesses for Musingku 
during his trial for contempt of court. Pastor 
Bob Lutu, Deputy Senior Pastor for the CLC, 
stated that Musingku was “a Born Again 
Christian… who faithfully attends Christian 
Life Centre…” (Lutu, 2000). “It has been our 
experience that the Church income was at a 
high level when members of the church were 
receiving returns on their investments under 
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the programme.” Many members invested 
in the scheme and donated this income to 
the church, funding a new building, social 
programs and the pastor’s own vehicle. Pastor 
Bob Lutu was even said to be on the board 
of U-Vistract. He and other pastors endorsed 
U-Vistract at Sunday worship and promoted 
the scheme to members. Their preaching 
also denounced BPNG and those within the 
church who were opposed to fast money 
schemes. As U-Vistract money dried up, the 
role of pastors promoting the scheme and 
investing church funds came under scrutiny. 
The CLC split into two congregations, partly 
due to divisions over U-Vistract. In 2006, the 
pastors involved were called to account and 
the church audited their finances. Eventually 
a formal apology was made and a service of 
reconciliation held. 
To be fair, not all Pentecostal churches 
were involved in money schemes with the 
same institutional enthusiasm as the CLC. 
The pastor of the World Outreach Christian 
Centre, a breakaway from CLC, was “red hot 
against the schemes”. Individual pastors from 
the Foursquare Gospel Church in Madang 
and Rabaul followed the CLC trend of using 
their positions to promote the schemes but 
were rebuked by the General Secretary and 
removed from ministry. Gibbs (2006: 122) 
notes the strong central organisation of the 
Foursquare Church, which may have acted 
as a check on the activities of individual 
pastors. 
FASt MONEy SChEMES AND thE 
PROSPERIty GOSPEl
The connections between fast money and 
religion are not only at the level of personal 
and organisational networks but extend to 
ideological affinities, particularly those shaped 
by the “prosperity gospel”. For Pentecostal 
Christianity globally, prosperity gospels are 
displacing the Protestant ethic of hard work 
and thrift. Where older Pentecostal attitudes 
to money were more ascetic, prosperity 
theology promises that God will reward 
tithing and other practices with even greater 
material returns. This reflects a “magical” 
approach to generation of wealth and even 
sanctifies consumerist desires and material 
aspirations (Robbins, 2004b: 137). 
Robbins (2004b) distinguishes older 
charismatic and Pentecostal movements from 
“Neo-Pentecostalism”, with its emphasis on 
prosperity. This division corresponds roughly 
to the development of Pentecostalism in PNG. 
Initially Pentecostal missions were based 
in rural areas and, like mainline churches, 
were involved in welfare and service delivery 
activities. The Four Square Church is an 
example, having recently celebrated 50 
years in PNG. In the 1970s, a “second wave” 
of Pentecostalism arrived in urban areas and 
attracted a more highly educated following, 
who were welcomed into lay leadership 
positions (Jorgensen, 2005: 448). Educated 
urban Pentecostals have formed a particularly 
responsive audience to prosperity teachings. 
Pentecostal churches teaching “prosperity 
theology” are growing (Robbins, 2004a; 
Jorgensen, 2005). Papua New Guineans 
are increasingly exposed to American 
televangelists, such as EMTV broadcasts 
of Dr Creflo A. Dollar.6 These preachers 
teach that faithfulness to God will result in 
substantial material rewards, especially if 
the appropriate donations are made. Other 
international evangelists have also conducted 
mass rallies in PNG: Prime Minster Bill Skate 
hosted Benny Hinn, a televangelist notorious 
for his ostentatious wealth (Gibbs, 2005). 
The Malaysian televangelist, Dr Jonathon 
David, also regularly tours PNG. According to 
U-Vistract, Dr David endorsed Musingku in a 
prophecy (U-Vistract News, 2001). 
Describing the “prosperity gospel”, a United 
Church pastor succinctly observed, “The 
common understanding is that, if you’re 
Christian and poor, there’s something wrong 
with you because God wants you to be rich”. 
He saw this teaching as common within 
Pentecostal churches and thought it was 
also starting to influence mainline churches 
(cf. Eves, 2008: 20 n6). The teachings of 
this type of prosperity gospel go well beyond 
spiritual reward, or even reward for hard 
work, by promising immediate transformation 
of Christians’ lives in very material and 
worldly ways. Christians should expect to 
be affluent and should see new cars and 
other status-oriented signs of wealth as 
divine blessings. These ideas are very much 
consonant with the promises of fast money 
schemes. Prosperity theology provided a 
ready language which Musingku used to 
sanctify his fraudulent activities. 
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The prosperity gospel valorises and 
sanctifies risk-taking or entrepreneurship,7 
creating a strong sense of moral entitlement 
needing evidence of fulfilment. The need 
for authentication of the prosperity gospel 
meant that Pentecostals were already 
expecting some mechanism that would 
deliver economic transformation. They 
were therefore predisposed to accepting 
U-Vistract. When pastors accepted U-Vistract 
money and claimed it as a gift from God (eg 
Lutu, 2000), this reflected the explanatory 
power of the prosperity gospel, not a naïveté 
concerning money itself. 
PENtECOStAlS AND thE StAtE
While prosperity beliefs may have made 
U-Vistract seem like “God’s answer to the 
poverty Christians were facing” (to quote one 
pastor), educated urban Pentecostals were 
also exposed to repeated public warnings 
from the Bank of PNG against the fast 
money schemes (eg. Bank of Papua New 
Guinea, 2005). How could devout Christians 
who supposedly submit to state authorities 
(Eves, 2008: 4) ignore these warnings from 
a government agency? I now explore three 
related themes relevant to this question: 
personal morality, millennialism and “winning 
the state”.   
Personal morality
U-VISTRACT- CHANGE AND GET 
PAID 
U-VISTRACT investors have been told 
to clean up their act if they want to 
get their money back and with profits. 
Supporters of the so-called “fast money’’ 
scheme gathered at the East Boroko 
house of principal officer Noah Ariku 
yesterday. Mr Ariku reportedly told the 
people that only born again Christians 
would be paid. U-Vistract is one of the 
schemes that promised thousands of Papua 
New Guineans huge dividends for their 
investments. Many are still waiting. Those 
who gathered after hearing rumours of a 
mass payout to come were met with gospel 
songs and a scripture reading from 1 
Timothy, talking about the love of money 
being evil. Mr Ariku told the people 
“God knows that money is everyone’s 
weakness’’. He said: “U-Vistract will 
not pay its investors until they become 
born-again Christians. “Every Papua New 
Guinean, whether you are an investor or 
not, a faithful Christian or not, have to 
confess that Jesus is Lord.’’ 
He assured the clients that “the money 
was already in the country, that’s why 
you see the value of the kina increasing 
again’’ (the kina has fallen steadily in the 
past week against the Australian and US 
dollars after rising earlier in the year). 
If payments were to be made, Mr Ariku 
said, it would be done strictly in line with 
the Ten Commandments of the Bible. 
“A person should not be a smoker, a 
womaniser, a gambler, if he or she wants 
to receive his monies from U-Vistract. We 
will screen everybody properly before we 
make payouts.’’ He claimed the payouts 
would be made in three phases. “Do not 
ask us about the timing. We are not in the 
business of disclosing dates of payouts. 
But we will do it according to God’s will 
and timing,’’ Mr Ariku said. 
(Post-Courier, 31 May 2001)
Pentecostals in Africa, Latin America and 
elsewhere have actively opposed corruption 
(eg. Meyer, 2004: 465). This is usually 
based on ideas of personal integrity, rather 
than a developed theology of the state 
(Smith, 2007: 210). Studying corruption and 
“419” fraud in Nigeria, Smith (2007: 211) 
demonstrates how Pentecostal Christianity 
has narrowed the sphere of public morality 
to focus on personal behaviour. Eves (2008: 
11-12) makes a similar point in relation to 
Papua New Guinea, where personal morality 
and piety have become part of the language 
in which political issues are debated (Hauck,
Mandie-Filer and Bolger, 2005: 22).8 
Musingku presented himself as a sincere 
Christian and claimed U-Vistract was a 
Christian ministry (see below). When the 
scheme ran out of money, a U-Vistract officer 
addressed investors and informed them 
that only born-again Christians would get 
their payments. U-Vistract’s Christian moral 
credentials were impeccable and drowned 
out the more sober warnings of BPNG. Many 
investors believed U-Vistract’s claims that 
BPNG was “jealous” of U-Vistract, or that a 
corrupt government wanted to appropriate 
U-Vistract’s investments. Reduction of the 
public sphere to personal morality has other 
implications. The role of the state becomes 
subsumed by religious imperatives. Gifford 
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(2004: 167-8) argues further that Pentecostal 
emphasis on personal morality and 
evangelism distracts from questions of service 
delivery and institutional strengthening–“only 
the Word of God can change society for the 
better and not governments”. As Eves (2008: 
20) puts it, “evangelism and prayer take 
the place of political activism”. U-Vistract’s 
Christian ministry pitted evangelism and 
prayer against the coercive and corrupt 
power of the PNG state.  
Millennialism and good governance
 “U-Vistract officials have informed their 
clients that the Company is a Christian 
Ministry commissioned to finance the 
End-Time Harvest...”
“…the organization is not a money scheme 
aimed at cheating people or making 
overnight millionaires. The organization is 
here to promote Christianity, peace, justice 
and equality.” 
“The organization is here to ensure that 
grassroots citizens not only accept Jesus 
Christ as their personal saviour but also to 
ensure that each family has enough food 
to eat each day, enough money to buy 
clothes, enough money to pay for school 
fees, accommodation, transport and all 
other basic necessities of life.”
(U-Vistract News, Nov 23, 2001, Vol1, 
Issue 12)
Eves (2008: 19-20) argues that millenarian 
expectations of the coming end of the world 
are fatalistic and so discourage commitment 
to governmental structures. Poor government 
services and corruption are explained in 
terms of millennial timetables and even 
serve to validate those expectations. 
Premillennialist Christians have often voiced 
hostility to the United Nations and other 
international institutions as they identify them 
as precursors of the “one world government” 
which will be headed by the Anti-Christ 
(Jorgensen, 2005: 444-5). 
Musingku’s claim that U-Vistract will “finance 
the end-time harvest” locates the scheme 
within these premillennial ideas. He also 
identifies “globalism” as something driven 
by the World Bank and other institutions 
in “the interests of the devil”. “Globalism” 
is responsible for oppression of “third 
world nations” and, particularly Christians. 
“Globalism” has also caused much suffering 
to U-Vistract investors as a result of the 
delayed payouts. Drawing on premillenial 
images of cosmic battle, Musingku claimed 
that U-Vistract systems were Godly systems 
fighting the powers behind “globalism”, which 
has coopted mainline churches, who are 
“feeding off the World Bank” (U-Vistract 
News, 2001: 11).9 
Unlike “globalism”, U-Vistract will guarantee 
self-sufficiency to all Papua New Guineans 
and eventually citizens of other developing 
countries (U-Vistract News, 2001: 11). 
Musingku used this critique to develop his 
own “ten step program” which would overturn 
worldly financial systems and bring about 
the “salvation and/or rescue of our land 
from all foreign domination” (Royal Reserve 
Bank of Papala, 2002). The “ten steps” 
focussed on stages of suffering and conflict 
akin to premillennialist beliefs concerning 
the “tribulation” and end times. Musingku’s 
economic and spiritual nationalism sits 
comfortably within Jorgensen’s “Third Wave” 
Pentecostalism. “Third Wave” Pentecostalism 
is remorselessly expansionist but works 
in the currency of particular nation states. 
Countries or groups of countries are targeted 
for prayer and mass evangelism. The borders 
of “spiritual warfare” correspond to secular 
polities and may even intrude into local 
cultural histories (Jorgensen, 2005). 
Winning the state
“OPPOSITION Leader Bill Skate 
yesterday urged all Christians in the 
country to “rise up and become politicians, 
prime ministers and departmental heads, 
as the ones now in office were liars 
and a bunch of hypocrites’’. Speaking 
at the launch of the PNG Evangelistic 
Association, Mr Skate said successive 
governments as well as the present leaders 
had failed the nation. He said that he had 
lost total confidence in the government 
bureaucracy and administration. He said 
“wicked people’’ were running the nation 
and called on Christians to show that there 
was hope at the end of the day. He urged 
all Christians to put Jesus Christ as the 
head of the nation and as the “bridge” to 
growth and prosperity.” 
(Post-Courier, 25 Sep 2001)
In tension with the millennialism just 
described, there is another Pentecostal trend 
that engages with the state by seeking to 
“shape the nation in their own image, to 
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accomplish their project of a Christian nation” 
(Roca, 2007: 322; cf. Coleman, 2000: 222-3). 
Because of their sense of moral superiority 
(Smith, 2007, 211), Christian professionals 
have a unique mission to guide the nation 
(Bill Skate10 (above); cf. Marshal 1995, 251-2, 
quoted in Smith 2007: 211). Pentecostals 
have been successful at attracting successful 
people (Jorgensen, 2005, 448). In turn, this 
has led to the establishment of informal 
networks within government bureaucracies 
and other centres of power. Having “born 
again” Christians in positions of influence 
begins to realign state institutions towards 
church goals, especially evangelistic ones 
(cf. Coleman, 2000: 191-2). Hence it is 
appropriate for the state to pay a tithe to 
the churches (Eves, 2008: 4).  Some further 
implications may perhaps be seen in the 
recent investigation of a high level Finance 
official, also an Assemblies of God pastor, 
who is alleged to have made illegal payments 
from public funds (National, 5 June 2006). At 
least some of these monies are suspected to 
have been used for church activities, such as 
buying land for the new Jubilee University, run 
by the Assemblies of God. Here the state has 
been reduced to a mere resource to support 
evangelism and church expansionism. 
As loyalty to the state is encompassed 
by loyalty to fellow Christians, ideas of 
good governance become blurred. Smith 
(2007: 217) gives an example of a devout 
Pentecostal doing business with a politician, 
allowing him to launder stolen money. 
Because the politician in question was a 
fellow Pentecostal, the businessman was 
untroubled by moral questions around the 
origins of the money. Smith attributes this to 
the ability to separate private morality from 
secular business and economic life. This 
example also illustrates an earlier point: 
prosperity theology allows people to claim 
money as a divine blessing, regardless of its 
origins (Smith, 2007: 213). The willingness of 
CLC Pastors to accept U-Vistract money and 
to support Musingku against state authorities 
provides a similar example. 
CONClUSIONS
The preceding discussion draws an 
unflattering picture of Pentecostals in PNG. 
This is unfair to many well-intentioned and 
sincere Christians. It is far from a complete or 
representative treatment of Pentecostalism 
in PNG. The bias is produced by starting 
with U-Vistract and exploring how the scam 
spread. Of course, Pentecostals were not 
the only ones involved: many other non-
Pentecostal Papua New Guineans were also 
taken in by fast money schemes. However, 
prosperity gospels and other related beliefs 
did make PNG’s Pentecostals particularly 
vulnerable to participation in the U-Vistract 
scam. Bill Skate’s born-again “inside track” 
was also highly significant in the early 
success of U-Vistract and related schemes 
such as Money Rain. 
This is not to imply that Pentecostals and 
money scams are co-extensive or that 
Pentecostalism everywhere is invariably pre-
disposed to facilitating the spread of fraud. In 
PNG, not all Pentecostals were involved in 
money schemes and many other Christians 
joined the rush without being Pentecostal. 
Many pastors who were heavily involved 
have since repented or else been removed 
from office. This demonstrates that there is a 
capacity for self-critique within the movement. 
It may even be that this self-critique provides 
the kind of grounds for engagement with 
fundamentalist Christians that Eves (2008: 
20) warns are difficult to locate. Musingku, 
on the other hand, has not renounced his 
ways and continues to produce materials 
explaining the imaginary progress of his 
payout system. He does so using the language 
and imagery of “Third Wave” Pentecostalism, 
embellished with idiosyncratic representations 
of Bougainvillean traditions and his own 
flamboyant claims to kingship. 
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PERSONAlly vIABlE 
MElANESIANS
Nick Bainton
The significance of these fast money 
schemes is thrown into further relief through 
comparison with the Personal Viability 
movement which aims to develop an 
entrepreneurial class and to counter “get 
rich quick” aspirations. Although Personal 
Viability is a national phenomenon in Papua 
New Guinea, I am interested in the ways in 
which it has been adopted as a development 
strategy by local leaders in the Lihir Islands 
in New Ireland Province in the context of 
large scale mining operations which began 
in 1995.11 When Lihirian leaders were 
introduced to the Personal Viability course 
in 2003, they hoped that the strategies and 
values propounded in the course would 
address Lihirian dependency upon mining 
and the associated economic inequalities 
that have devastated Lihirian society. This 
process sheds new light on the ways that 
Melanesian people respond to and manage 
political and economic change, and how 
they view and choose paths to prosperity 
and economic development. In this section I 
begin with a description of Personal Viability 
and the content of the course, particularly 
as it has been presented in Lihir. This is 
followed by a discussion on the unique ways 
that Personal Viability has been integrated 
into the Lihirian mining compensation and 
benefits agreement and how it is practiced 
and perceived in daily contexts.  
The Personal Viability course (often described 
simply as “PV”), was created in the late 1990s 
by Samuel Tam, a Papua New Guinean-
born Chinese businessman, who argued that 
Papua New Guinea can become a “viable” 
nation. For the past ten years, Tam has been 
taking active steps to reverse what he see 
as negative trends in Papua New Guinea 
with a view to transforming the country 
from the “grassroots” up. Where politicians, 
bureaucratic planners and consultants have 
searched for policy reform and the right 
formula for distributing wealth, services 
and infrastructure, Tam has prescribed 
strategies that put the onus back on the 
individual. According to Tam, the apparent 
development “failures” over the past thirty 
years and the palpable decline in national 
living standards can be attributed to the lack 
of entrepreneurialism–or Personal Viability. 
Hence PV is defined very much in financial 
terms as part of a broader framework of 
capitalist economic development that should 
be embraced by each Papua New Guinean. 
The PV course is intended to deliver the kind 
of education that will unleash Papua New 
Guineans from those constraints that impede 
economic progress and the improvement of 
living standards. Tam’s vision is that Papua 
New Guinea might achieve self reliance 
and financial independence by transforming 
its citizens from grass roots subsistence 
farmers bound by a world of custom and 
parochial economies, into self sufficient 
entrepreneurial capitalists, active in a national 
if not global market. The sentiments of PV 
reflect a mixture of bottom-up development, 
self sufficiency, Christian morality, a neo-
Protestant work ethic, Western individualism 
and faith in neo-classical economics. It is 
a jumble of nationalist and entrepreneurial 
rhetoric, designed to compel individuals to 
play their economic role for themselves and 
their country. 
PV has been endorsed by the National 
Government and various religious institutions 
who promote it as the new answer for 
Papua New Guineans. The Government 
has regularly used the course for capacity 
building exercises, and there has been a 
growing interest among community groups 
looking to advance their own grassroots 
economic activities (see Nalu, 2006; and 
Unage, 2006). In 2007 Tam took PV to 
Solomon Islands. The Government Caucus 
reportedly endorsed PV as the model for 
future economic development, and awarded 
Tam the Cross of Solomon Islands in 
recognition of his assistance.  
Born of Chinese parentage in Rabaul, Tam 
is a reserved man, somewhat suspicious of 
expatriates, and highly determined to witness 
change throughout Melanesia. He is tertiary 
educated, experienced in corporate business 
and state politics, and affectionately known 
to PV followers as “Papa Sam”. His Chinese 
heritage elicits mixed responses from different 
groups. For some he represents the new 
wave of successful Asian entrepreneurs in 
the Pacific (see especially Crocombe, 2007). 
In these instances his ethnic identity does not 
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carry the same racial baggage held by kiaps, 
NGO advisers, volunteers, missionaries and 
emissaries of the Australian Government 
deployed to keep a watchful eye on foreign 
aid. For many others, mixed feelings of 
ambivalence and hostility towards Asians 
colour their response to PV.12 
Course participants are told various 
renditions of Tam’s rags to riches experience, 
beginning with the death of his father in 
the Second World War, his education in 
Australia, early entrepreneurial activities in 
Port Moresby, his leading involvement in 
the Stret Pasin Stoa scheme, and eventual 
financial demise that inspired him to develop 
PV.13 The story of a businessman of migrant 
origins, with few familial ties, values wholly 
derived from modern society and no with 
customary obligations is now being held up 
for Melanesians, of all classes, educational 
backgrounds and cultural origins to admire 
and aspire to. His story has entered what 
Errington and Gewertz describe as the 
“intersection between different narratives of 
the desirable and the feasible” (2004: 15); it 
is presented as the apex of achievement and 
the new definition of reasonable expectation 
and accomplishment.14
The PV course is part of Tam’s wider 
program for national development that he 
envisages will be driven and administered 
by his Entrepreneurial Development Training 
Centre (EDTC); however, this programme 
currently exists only in an embryonic form, 
and national implementation has not yet been 
achieved. The courses are taught by “trained 
teachers” certified by Tam’s EDTC, working 
as faithful disciples to spread the good news 
of his modernist doctrine. Within the EDTC 
there are various PV courses, ranging from 
entry or “village level” to more advanced 
business courses for those who are already 
“PV literate”. His plans also include the 
establishment of a national Grasruts Benk 
(Grassroots Bank) to act as a microfinance 
institution for PV members, and the Grasruts 
Yuniversiti (Grassroots University) which will 
have centres around the country, teaching 
PV and other related courses, and will act as 
bureaucratic hubs for the administration of 
PV related programmes. These institutions 
and his administrative system are designed 
to apply the total PV package throughout the 
land to create a nation of shop keepers and 
managers linked within his politico-economic 
model. 
This national plan hinges upon a complex 
grading system for PV followers, whereby 
“PV grades” or ranks are achieved by 
completing various levels of the PV course 
and the measuring of individual achievement 
in entrepreneurial endeavours and other 
facets of people’s lives, such as church 
leadership or family management, or the 
ability to meet customary obligations. 
The attainment of a bronze, silver or gold 
ranking will objectify social and economic 
status and determine how much money PV 
followers can borrow from the Grassroots 
Bank. According to Tam, course completion 
and entrepreneurial achievements will 
officially determine individual social “class”, 
supposedly motivating further individual 
economic and political ascension.
twO wEEk tRANSFORMAtION
PV courses are usually held in village 
community halls or church buildings to 
emphasise “grassroots accessibility”. In 2004 
it cost 200 kina to participate in a basic 
two week course. These are open to all 
adults, regardless of their education or work 
experience and it is anticipated that children 
will begin learning PV through the PV Home 
School Program. Communities can apply to 
the EDTC for PV trainers to come to their 
area if there is not already an established 
EDTC program in their region. 
Courses typically begin with a short lecture 
on the personally viable modern Melanesian 
based on the following definition:  
PV is the perpetual self-discovery, 
perpetual re-shaping to realize one’s best 
self, to be the person one could be. It is 
the sustainable development of human 
resources with individual skills to be their 
best. PV involves the emotions, character, 
personality, deeper layers of thought and 
action, adaptability, creativeness and 
vitality. And it involves moral spiritual 
growth….it is about finding yourself and 
owning your self. (Tam, 1997: 11)
Each day begins with prayers and the recital 
of the PV and national anthem, designed 
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to foster national pride and individual 
obligation. The course is structured around 
the ideologies of the entrepreneur and the 
teaching of basic micro economics and after 
ten days participants are expected to be 
completely familiar with the Entrepreneur’s 
Doctrine (taken from the official creed of the 
Entrepreneurs Association of America). 
Grounded in quasi world systems theory 
and neoliberal rhetoric, PV aims to create 
successful entrepreneurs who can reverse 
the economic trends of the past millennium. 
Using terms such as core and periphery, 
marginal and centre, and first and third world, 
people are encouraged to think of the ways in 
which Western countries have progressively 
created conditions of dependence for 
countries like Papua New Guinea. Borrowing 
heavily from neo-Marxist critiques of Papua 
New Guinea’s post Independence economy 
(such as Amarshi et al, 1979), the idea is to 
illustrate the global exploitation that keeps 
countries with people of predominately darker 
skin on the margins and under the control of 
the countries in the centre with predominately 
white skin who are in positions of authority 
and relative luxury and wealth. Papua New 
Guineans are presented as cheap labour 
and nameless peripheral villages are the 
sites of necessary labour power reproduction 
for capital intensive centres (cf. Fitzpatrick, 
1980; Meillassoux, 1981). In the PV courses 
conducted throughout Lihir, many participants 
immediately made the link with the mine and 
recounted their experiences as “cargo boys” 
and “work boys”. Much of this conversation 
echoes a more general dissatisfaction among 
Lihirian employees concerning employment 
policies and practices of the mining company 
that appear to privilege expatriates over 
Lihirians. 
Inadvertently demonstrating the internal 
contradictions of PV ideology, the  next stage 
of the course emphasises that personal 
failure, poverty and inequality are not the 
result of a world system that reproduces 
injustices, but a lack of Personal Viability. 
On the one hand people are told that 
their “plight” can be understood through a 
structural analysis of global capital flows, and 
on the other hand the onus is put back on the 
individual; no longer can people blame the 
Government, isolation, or global history. This 
is reinforced through the repetition of popular 
NGO slogans, such as “give a man a fish and 
you feed him today, teach him how to fish 
and you feed him for a lifetime”. Ultimately 
participants are taught important lessons 
in the rhetoric of possessive individualism, 
particularly as it shadows liberal democracy 
and promotes the individual as proprietor of 
the self, who owes nothing to society and is 
free to act on their own individual conscience. 
What Tam seeks to foster in Papua New 
Guineans and the nation as a whole reflects 
Hobbes’ “self-moving, appetitive possessive 
individual, and the model of society as a 
series of market relations between these 
individuals” (Macpherson, 1989: 265).
PRACtICAl lESSONS IN SElF 
MAStERy 
For apprentices of the school of Personal 
Viability, the course is not all pithy self-
empowering aphorisms. Students are 
assessed and expected to meet deadlines 
for small assignments and group tasks. There 
are daily exercises in “grassroots maths” 
that teach basic requirements for running 
trade stores and other small businesses. 
Compared to the time devoted to reciting 
and rote learning anthems and mantras, a 
remarkably small proportion of the course 
is actually dedicated to these pragmatic and 
useful skills. These exercises are built upon 
each day over the period of the course, 
and as a marker of grassroots authenticity 
participants are told to do away with ideas of 
“laptops and supercomputers”, and to start 
using their own “neck-top computer”. Drawing 
upon Papua New Guinean agricultural 
capacities, Tam encourages people to plant 
“money gardens”, a PV term that not only 
refers to cash crops and market produce, 
but any small entrepreneurial endeavour that 
“grows” money. There is a strong emphasis 
on harvesting “nature’s abundance that is 
given to Papua New Guineans from God”, 
shifting people’s focus from being custodians 
or stewards of God’s creation to exploiters 
and successful managers.15  
Within the rubric of personal transformation, 
participants are taught how to efficiently 
manage their daily finances, and how to say 
no to the demands and requests of their 
relatives. For the PV minded, it is important 
to always ask how much money can be 
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made from a particular activity and how 
can personal performance be improved? 
Participants are urged to compare their daily 
routines with the following time chart for the 
‘average village person’:  
Productive–gardening, ploughing, 
weeding, planting; feeding livestock; 
fishing; building; selling produce; putting 
the [nuclear] family first. 
Unproductive–gossiping; waiting for 
opportunities or handouts; visiting 
relatives (wantoks); sleeping during the 
day; sitting idle around the village; giving 
dinau [loans]. 
This analysis is coupled with warnings not 
to waste their time, their most valuable 
asset: “if you cannot control the time you 
have left in your life you will find it very 
difficult to control anything else…Time is 
running out quicker than you think!” (Tam, 
1997: 28-29). In this new order time is 
privatised and individuals are responsible for 
its effective use. These lessons also seek to 
transform generic notions of village relations 
by positing the individual (and the nuclear 
family) as a paramount value. In practice 
this tests the moral grounds for relationships, 
revealing the deep connection between 
different forms of wealth transaction and 
individual moral identities. Learning to favour 
personal ambition over collective stability 
means economic imperatives must outweigh 
social necessities. 
SElF DISCIPlINE
PV is divided into the “four growth disciplines”: 
productivity discipline, law of success 
discipline, economy discipline, and integrity 
discipline. These disciplines, which can be 
measured, form the basis of the PV grading 
system. This is an array of measurements 
designed to gauge an individual’s viability 
and quantify their ability to “add value to 
themselves and commodities” (Tam, 1997: 
36). By measuring the quantity sold, or the 
profit achieved, and the rate of expansion 
and personal progression, “viable people” 
can prove that they are constantly “adding 
value”. These disciplines specifically target 
economic output (productivity), savings and 
investments (economic), ability to meet 
projected business targets and maintain 
satisfied customers (law of success), and 
finally the ability to fulfil obligations in all areas 
of life, such as business, family, custom, or 
church (integrity). 
The grading system assumes a lack of 
motivation among Papua New Guineans; 
the various ranks are supposed to persuade 
people to achieve a higher grade that reflects 
individual earning capacity, credit ratings 
and supposedly a greater contribution to 
society. Grading is to be conducted annually 
by EDTC accredited grading supervisors. In 
2004 PV followers could purchase an official 
“EDTC Are You Viable?” badge with the 
name of the recipient embossed, to be worn 
proudly to display one’s rank and encourage 
others to improve themselves. 
Grading essentially involves verifying the 
claims of the PV follower: what activities 
have been completed; what are the annual 
profit margins; have expenses, surpluses 
and savings been recorded, and where are 
they held; have sales and productivity reports 
been produced; and what is the quality of the 
goods and services being sold. Inspectors 
should report on the morale of the “Team” 
(family, or staff who work underneath the 
graded individual), which means assessing 
whether younger family members only 
contribute because they fear retribution, or 
whether they fully appreciate all the benefits 
that PV can bring into their lives. Ultimately PV 
encourages a heightened self consciousness 
and intensifies self derision in the name of 
personal development.
The entire process from reflection to 
conversion (and public testimony during the 
course graduation ceremonies) is significantly 
theological in tenor. What emerges from this 
constant assessment and self-reflection is an 
extension of the Christian moral ethos of self 
examination so that it becomes a natural part 
of the modernising process for the aspiring 
subject. Regular grading increases people’s 
openness to the people and institutions 
identified with the power and success of the 
larger world. There is also a clear redemptive 
strain, where the old “handout mentality” 
ways register as the analogues of sin. PV 
adherents are urged to make a “break with 
the past” so that they might step forward into 
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the liberating freedom of economic rationality. 
While PV is not a religious movement, Tam 
does draw a certain moral justification for 
his teachings from Biblical Scripture, and 
there are strong parallels with the type of 
prosperity theology described by Cox.   
COllECtIvE vIABIlIty, OR 
INStABIlIty?
One of the ways people are encouraged 
to perform their viability is by organising 
their family according to corporate structure, 
where each member continually proves their 
productivity by contributing income towards 
living expenses. Weekly meetings should 
be held, and records must be kept to ensure 
productivity levels increase; here the nuclear 
family is the base model for micro-collective 
enterprise. Supposedly this will instil the 
PV mentality at the home level, eventually 
reinforced by a community of like-minded 
families. 
The next level is the formation of village based 
PV clubs, or collectives that pool resources, 
finances and labour for individual and group 
projects. Some function as a microfinance 
resource, providing small interest-free loans 
to members (anything up to K200) to start 
another money garden project, pay school 
fees or for other emergencies. From Tam’s 
perspective, when left to their own devices 
Papua New Guineans inevitably fall by the 
wayside of PV. Clubs provide support and 
encouragement for floundering entrepreneurs. 
Modelled on corporate organisations, clubs 
elect a president and various officer holders, 
coupled with committees for different projects. 
Ideally there should be a club for every 
village and a head member for each local 
government ward. Their duty is to make 
sure clubs function effectively, to help recruit 
new followers, and guard against declining 
interest or enthusiasm.  However, as we shall 
see in the following section, in the Lihirian 
context it often proves difficult to enact these 
ideal strategies. Paradoxically, in practice 
this reality is hidden by the enthusiasm with 
which certain Lihirian leaders have embraced 
PV as a way to mitigate the negative socio-
economic distortions and consequences of 
mining.  
Pv IN thE lIhIR ISlANDS
Prior to mining there were few economic 
activities taking place in Lihir and minimal 
engagement with both the colonial 
administration and the new Independent 
Government. Many Lihirians interpreted 
the mine as the fulfilment of prophesies 
for radical change that emerged in earlier 
politico-religious movements throughout the 
1960s and 70s (see Bainton 2008a). This has 
also encouraged the belief among Lihirians 
that they own the mine, and fostered the 
unrealistic expectation that all Lihirians will 
benefit equally from the project. Even though 
most of the younger generation are sceptical 
of earlier esoteric interpretations, nearly 
everybody still expects that the company 
will deliver unconditional and equalising 
economic development. Consequently this 
has generated an ambiguous and often 
strained relationship between Lihirians, the 
company and the state, played out in a 
confusing battle over the roles of “patron” 
and “client” (cf. Toft, 1997). 
Since mining began, the Lihirian population 
has steadily increased from around 5500 
people in 1980 to some 14000 in 2007. 
Only a minority of Lihirians have become 
full-time wage earners and not everyone 
has benefited from the project in the ways 
that they anticipated. During the early stages 
of the operation when the company began 
releasing the first compensation and royalty 
payments, Lihirians became locked in a 
vortex of winmoni mania–a Tok Pisin term 
that literally translates into “win money” or 
windfall, and carries with it connotations of 
money acquired by luck or that simply “blows 
in”, emphasising the “mysteriousness” and 
“irrationality” of Western wealth accumulation. 
However, infrastructure and wealth from 
royalty and compensation payments have 
been extremely unequally distributed across 
the islands. 
The Villages of Putput, Kapit and Londolovit, 
which are comprised of those clans that 
claim ownership over land within the Special 
Mining Lease zone, now occupy the upper 
stratum in Lihir. Prior to mining these villages 
were relatively undifferentiated from the rest 
of Lihir, as people relied upon a combination 
of subsistence farming and sporadic 
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copra sales. A core group of six men have 
received over one million kina each in land 
payments since mining began, and 95 have 
each received between 100,000 kina to 
one million kina in payments. The bulk of 
the “landowning” community is comprised 
of some 1700 people who have received 
between two to 10,000 kina in various lands 
payments. Lihirians expect that individuals 
will distribute these payments throughout 
their matrilineal clan networks which spread 
across the entire group of islands; however 
in reality this wealth has become increasingly 
concentrated among an elite minority. 
Although royalties and compensation are 
the most symbolic form of wealth, wages 
constitute the most regular, and the largest, 
flow of money into the local economy. In 
2002 the company employed 986 staff, of 
which 366 (or 38%) were Lihirian. In 2007, 
there were some 1989 full-time employees, 
of whom 753 were Lihirian, and 1059 were 
nationals. In 2007 the mine only employed 
around 10 percept of working age Lihirians, 
but there were probably twice as many 
working for local contractor companies. 
Nevertheless, wage labourers remain a 
minority and are not evenly spread throughout 
the islands. Just as royalty payments are 
heavily concentrated around “landowning” 
villages these areas also house the greatest 
number of wage earners. Lihirians generally 
consider access to employment as their right 
by virtue of their status as the hosts, or the 
“owners” of the resource. This is supported 
by the rather unrealistic expectation that 
all Lihirians will gain employment with the 
company and that Lihirians will play a more 
significant role in managing the operation. 
Consequently those people without access 
to royalty and compensation payments who 
also fail to secure employment feel doubly 
disillusioned.
The rapid social, economic and political 
changes experienced through mining have 
torn apart many existing social networks, 
presented new challenges to village 
leadership, altered gender relations (often 
for the worse), and left many people with a 
profound sense of cultural rupture (Bainton 
2008b, 2009). Lihirians are acutely aware 
of new inequalities, which are often the 
source of community conflicts. The growing 
number of people who feel as though they 
have not benefited from the mine in the 
anticipated ways – where everyone would be 
comfortably rich – has generated widespread 
disillusionment with the mining project, 
the state and capitalism more generally. 
People regularly blame a combination of 
state, landowner and corporate greed for 
their dilemmas, though depending upon 
the context one might be emphasised over 
another. 
The landmark Integrated Benefits Package 
(IBP) that was signed by Lihirians, the state 
and the mining company in 1995 (see Banks, 
1998; and Filer, 1995, 2000) was supposed 
to deliver some form of sustainable economic 
development to the Lihirian community, 
with provisions for infrastructure, services 
and housing improvement. By 2000 when 
the review of the agreement began, it was 
apparent that many of the expected outcomes 
had not transpired. The review wore on 
as Lihirian leaders from the landowners 
association and the local level government 
struggled to reach a satisfactory agreement 
among themselves and with the company 
and the state. Lihirian leaders all wanted to 
address the massive inequality generated 
through mining, the prodigal spending habits 
of landowners who had grown accustomed 
to a constant source of disposable income, 
the growing dependency upon scarce wage 
labour, and the more general community 
expectation that the company will deliver 
all forms of economic development. For the 
first time Lihirian leaders were beginning 
to consider the inevitable prospect of mine 
closure and the need for long term alternative 
economic activities to support the continued 
delivery and maintenance of services and 
infrastructure. But they were unable to decide 
on the right path. 
When these leaders were introduced 
to Samuel Tam in 2003 they were soon 
convinced that the wholesale adoption of PV 
was the only way to combat the so-called 
“handout mentality” or “resource dependency 
syndrome”, and to achieve what they termed 
“self reliance and financial independence”. 
They wanted to prove to the state and the 
company that Lihirians were not backward 
cultists, but modern Melanesians worthy of 
respect and equality and capable of achieving 
a desired level of modernity.   
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In 2005 the review of the benefits agreement 
remained incomplete. PV was strongly 
promoted throughout the islands but there 
were growing doubts over the suitability of 
this approach. Leadership was now split as 
a small number of educated (save) men who 
were aligned with the leading executives of 
the landowners association seized control of 
the review, effectively reducing the influence 
of the local level government. These men 
began devising plans for future economic 
development that combined mining wealth 
with notions of individual responsibility. These 
plans would eventually become known as 
Lihir Sustainable Development Plan (LSDP), 
which formed the basis for the revised 
IBP agreement that was finally signed in 
2007 – though not without a great deal of 
consternation, political division, and general 
confusion throughout Lihir. These local 
leaders described the LSDP as their “road 
map” for achieving what they called the “Lihir 
Destiny”. They had appropriated PV for their 
goals, reviving earlier separatist sentiments 
in order to keep mine related wealth in Lihir 
and to reduce the state’s ability to influence 
Lihirian lives. In essence they were looking 
for ways to simultaneously develop individual 
capacities and to maximise the economic 
and political opportunities presented through 
mining operations. This plan was a blue print 
for a new order to be established through 
mining benefits and sustained through 
individual entrepreneurialism. 
The new agreement was structured on 
commitment from the company for the 
payment of one hundred million kina over 
five years, funding compensation payments, 
delivery and maintenance of services and 
infrastructure, and a raft of community 
development programs. From an early stage 
the authors of the LSDP recognised that 
this amount of funding would be insufficient 
to meet all Lihirian needs (now or in the 
future) or to level out existing inequalities. 
It is for this reason that PV has been so 
appealing: common goals or “the common 
good” will only be reached through individual 
efforts. By using the benefits package to 
train Lihirians in entrepreneurialism and to 
create economic activities that Lihirians can 
engage in, the authors of the LSDP hope to 
reach some form of self sufficiency. However, 
competitive capitalism has rarely provided 
equal opportunities, and not all Lihirians have 
been willing to follow this strategy. 
There have been some disagreements 
between Tam and the authors of the LSDP 
over the nature of their strategy and the 
ownership of PV, but Tam has generally 
supported and encouraged their approach. 
Moreover, given that Lihir is one of the few 
places with the resources and the desire to 
adopt the total PV package, Tam stands to 
reap considerable returns through the EDTC 
franchise. Although PV is the central plank 
in this new vision, not everyone has been 
fully convinced that this road will lead to the 
desired land of modernisation. Some people 
have embraced PV as a way of life, while 
others have rejected it, or at least struggled 
to reconcile its overtly entrepreneurial 
emphasis with traditional Lihirian values. 
Landowners who receive regular payment 
of mining benefits have generally found PV 
irrelevant, while many other members of 
the wider community still impatiently wait 
for wealth and development to be delivered 
by the company or some other institution. 
Consequently there remains a great deal of 
heat surrounding the new agreement that 
now commits some 10 million kina to the 
implementation of PV programs throughout 
Lihir. 
Pv IN PRACtICE
Shifting from the planning and policy level 
to the ground upon which these decisions 
are made, we find that PV in practice 
has proven somewhat problematic. Many 
Lihirians initially thought that PV was the 
key to wealth accumulation, especially those 
without access to royalties and compensation 
payments. Large numbers eagerly enrolled 
in their nearest course, believing that they 
could achieve their dreams through this 
“home-grown” approach. Indeed, this is why 
it was appropriated by local leaders and the 
authors of the LSDP – to demonstrate to 
the company and the Government that they 
understood the ‘White man’s secret’, and that 
they also had their own (alter)native answers 
to the development riddle. Despite initial 
enthusiasm and the pivotal role of PV in the 
new agreement there is growing community 
disillusionment with both PV and the LSDP, 
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and little evidence of dramatically improved 
entrepreneurial performance.  Although the 
authors of the LSDP remain ideologically 
committed to PV, they maintain a tenuous 
position within Lihir, especially as people 
begin to question how the wider community 
will benefit from this new strategy while 
existing inequalities remain apparent and 
more immediate needs absorb people’s 
attention. 
PV faces several challenges in the Lihir 
context, in particular the skewed mining 
economy that is coupled with inflated 
community expectations, and the heightened 
sense of traditionalism manifest through 
an ideology of custom. The huge amount 
of wealth that circulates throughout Lihir 
is regularly ploughed back into large-scale 
customary feasting and exchange activities. 
Rather than undermining custom, mining has 
provided the resources for its efflorescence. 
In response to the extreme experience of 
mining, many Lihirians have reified Lihirian 
custom, or the values and social relations 
associated with these activities, which are 
opposed to the sociality associated with 
development, or capitalism more generally. 
More often than not, people find that their 
attempts to conduct business within the 
village setting, or their strategies to get 
ahead, are constantly compromised by these 
competing values. PV followers like to imagine 
that their economic activities are set apart 
from the petty market sales of the average 
villager, not least of all because they aim to 
advance beyond ad hoc sales, to a regular 
income supported by a growing “clientele 
base”. More importantly they often state 
that there will be no bartering, exchange, 
credit or favours, regardless of kinship and 
custom obligations. Ultimately PV projects 
are supposed to operate separately from 
the gift economy or custom. Although the 
“integrity discipline” purports to measure 
individual performances in custom activities, 
in so far these transactions reflect economic 
commitments, PV implicitly encourages less, 
or at least more regulated, involvement in 
custom. 
PV clubs cut across clan and family ties, 
and exclude anyone that had not taken 
the course and proven their “PV literacy”, 
which in the village context has increasingly 
come to mean the ability to converse using 
PV idioms, rather than demonstrate any 
recognisable form of entrepreneurial initiative. 
The use of commonly understood terms and 
phrases, exclusive to PV followers, generates 
a sense of ethos among club members. This 
is important, because in practice their petty 
market sales are not always distinguishable 
from those of non-PV followers.
PV urges people to compartmentalise their 
daily life in terms of a perceived distinction 
between socio-economic spheres. In 
reality it often proves impossible to pry 
apart the tangled relationship between 
different domains through ritual adherence 
to PV which promises some level of financial 
autonomy from local webs of custom and 
kinship. It is this tension that causes some 
people to reject PV, claiming that ‘PV em i 
no olsem kastom bilong yumi’ (PV is not like 
our custom). This new resistance is couched 
in the discourse of custom, but it also stems 
from a realisation that any “secrets” they 
are learning from PV are difficult to perform 
and usually contradict existing dispositions, 
values and expectations. Many try to 
establish their money garden only to find 
their efforts strangled by kinship roots. While 
some people might consider themselves 
as potential businessmen it is often the 
same people who are quite disparaging of 
others who are successful at the expense 
of social relations. Their reactions capture 
the contradiction of Lihirian desire: people 
want to learn how to produce money for 
themselves and gain financial autonomy, but 
not necessarily at the expense of existing 
sociality. 
Despite this enduring dilemma and the 
community’s rising disillusionment with PV 
and the promises made in the LSDP, those 
leaders who advocated this strategy remain 
firmly committed. They have responded 
with increased rational modernist discourse, 
arguing that Lihirians simply need more 
motivation, and that once their plans are 
fully mobilised people will see the light and 
adjust their lifestyles accordingly.  As a result 
this has only further distanced them from the 
wider population who feel that plans for their 
future were made without their consultation, 
and fail to reflect community sentiments and 
expectations. 
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By way of conclusion it is worth briefly 
considering some of the broader implications 
of PV in Lihir. We can find strong parallels 
between the expectations for instant 
wealth fostered by fast money schemes 
and the expectations among landowning 
communities, especially their disenfranchised 
neighbours and relatives, for mining 
companies to instantly deliver all forms of 
economic development. The PV movement, 
which was deliberately adopted by Lihirian 
leaders to combat this dependency, might 
be considered the rational counter-part to 
the sort of winmoni mania generated by 
fast money schemes and the delivery of 
huge compensation and royalty payments to 
landowning communities. However, the ways 
in which some people have put their faith in 
PV, almost as end in itself which is ritually 
enacted, should give rise to some level of 
caution. Perhaps even more concerning, 
is that as a device for addressing issues of 
economic dependency, PV seems to be more 
effective as a moral ideology that justifies the 
very inequalities it purports to reverse. 
The dominant neoliberal economic discourse, 
which PV intensifies and internalises within 
people, assumes that out of the way places 
such as Lihir can credibly be developed 
and diversified. Accordingly, there are no 
limits to growth and all that is needed is 
the right attitude, capital and laissez faire 
government, or as it is expressed in PV 
terminology, a “conducive environment”. In 
the end the mine is the central economic 
opportunity for Lihirians, and while it remains, 
it will always prove exceedingly difficult to 
generate significant economic diversification. 
While there are a large number of successful 
companies that provide various services in 
Lihir, they are all dependent upon the mining 
project for their operation. But the myths 
of economic development in the context of 
mining as promulgated by PV conceal an even 
more disturbing reality. While the grassroots 
are expected to be content digging around 
in their money gardens, elite landowners 
still have the freedom and capacity to invest 
abroad, send their children to better schools, 
gain more lucrative business contracts with 
the mining company, or simply enjoy their 
wealth with little thought for tomorrow. This 
is only compounded by the presence of 
expatriate miners who appear to the average 
Lihirian to be living comparatively luxurious 
lifestyles. Certainly some Lihirians have 
recognised such discrepancies, fuelling their 
rejection or antagonism towards PV, whilst 
leaving them with the sense that the “real 
development” lies elsewhere.  
The question faced by Lihirian leaders, 
company management and the state, is how 
to turn resource rents, or the larger benefits 
package (or what economists term the 
economic surplus), into long term equitable 
and sustainable economic development that 
will maintain service provision beyond the 
life of the mine. All large-scale resource 
development projects throughout Melanesia 
are confronted with this challenge. The LSDP 
might be considered a progressive response 
with its emphasis on service delivery that is 
designed to offer a more socially equitable 
means of distributing long term benefits 
regardless of landowner status. However, 
the question remains whether the strong 
neoliberal themes emphasised through PV 
will divert attention from the more equitable 
distribution of wealth–whether it is through 
customary channels or governance structures 
and local development plans–and entrench 
the elite capture of royalties which remains 
the most divisive element in Lihir. Ultimately 
addressing such arbitrary distinctions will 
determine the long term social and economic 
viability of the Lihir islands. 
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ENDNOtES
1.    I use the general term “pyramid scam” to 
include what are more correctly known as 
Ponzi schemes: scams which generate a 
great rush of investors based on false 
promises of huge and rapid returns. Pyr-
amid scams and Ponzi schemes should 
be distinguished from pyramid selling 
schemes, such as Amway and the like. 
Pyramid selling (or multi-level market-
ing) is not inherently fraudulent, although 
some scams, such as Questnet, do oper-
ate in PNG using multi-level marketing 
structures. 
2. ‘FAST money schemes were risky 
businesses but provided a “window of hope” 
for investors, especially simple villagers, 
according to the late Joseph Kabui, former 
president  of the Bougainville People’s 
Congress. Mr Kabui said Prime Minister 
Sir Mekere Morauta’s announcement on 
the establishment of a committee to look 
into the operations of the schemes is a 
move in the right direction. He stressed a 
need to exempt U-Vistract, Money Link, 
Millennium and Nekong from paying tax 
to the Government in their Bougainvillle 
operations. “While investors know that 
there are risks involved, they are also 
aware of the benefits provided by the 
schemes”, he said. “By investing in the 
schemes, small investors in Bougainville 
have planned to rebuild houses destroyed 
during the crisis, pay for children’s school 
fees and meet costs for other basic needs 
and services. The schemes, do provide 
a window of hope and opportunities to 
a simple villager who has placed his/her 
trust in the operations of the schemes 
by investing.’’ He sympathised with the 
owners of the schemes who were being 
pressured by clients to pay out their 
money. The Government through the 
Central Bank is also exerting pressure on 
the schemes to comply with the country’s 
Finance Acts. He called for understanding 
from the Government when dealing with 
the fast money making schemes on 
Bougainville’ (Post-Courier, 26 August 
1999).
3. The closeness of the two schemes may 
be seen in the case of two Bougainvillean 
sisters based in Madang: one was the 
local agent for U-Vistract and other for 
Money Rain. 
4. The Fijians claimed they were coming to 
Bougainville as missionaries! (Post-Cou-
rier 29 Sep 2007)
5. This gesture attracted condemnation from 
the Catholic Archbishop of PNG (National 
31 July 2009) but also serves as a fine 
symbol of Musingku’s idiosyncratic meld-
ing of finance and religion. 
6. See www.creflodollarministries.org for 
the work of this Afro-American preacher 
with a most intriguing name. 
7. Coleman 2000, 195. Compare Cahn 
(2006) on multi-level marketing schemes 
in Mexico.
8.  Cf. Kurer 2007, who makes a more 
general remark about good character, 
corruption and clientelism.
9. In an apparent back flip, Musingku later 
claimed his money was coming from the 
World Bank, prompting a denial by the 
Bank’s Papua New Guinea Manager 
(Post-Courier 28 Feb 2006).  
10.  “The two years under Bill Skate were 
widely viewed as the most corrupt, and 
the worst administered, in PNG’s brief 
but increasingly sad history as a nation.” 
(Callick, 2000). See also Eves (2008, 
5-6). 
11. The Lihir gold mine is currently operated 
by Lihir Gold Limited. 
12. To be sure, the growing Asian presence 
throughout Papua New Guinea has come 
under increased local scrutiny, especially 
in the logging industry (Crocombe, 2007: 
64, 134). Asian influence has shifted 
from small businesses among the ‘older 
Chinese’, to corporate investment in the 
extractive industries, hotels and other 
areas of commerce, which also seems 
to be accompanied by greater levels of 
corruption and organised crime. 
13. Details of his life history can also be found 
at the PV website: http://www.edtc.ac.pg
14. There are evident correlations between 
Tam’s messages and prosperity theology 
found in some of the more charismatic 
churches throughout Papua New 
Guinea. 
15. For similar discussions on the ways 
Melanesians engage with environmental 
discourse see especially Macintyre and 
Foale, 2004: 235. Helden, 1998; cf. 
Kirsch, 2004; West, 2005).
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